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Chapter 10
First person singular
in 17th century controversies
Gerd Fritz
. Introductory remarks
This paper presents research conducted in the framework of an interdisci-
plinary project on “Controversies in the République des Lettres (1600–1800)”
by a group of philosophers from Tel Aviv (Israel) and a group of linguists from
Gießen(Germany).1 Oneof the objectives ofthis project isto analyze the prag-
matic organization of controversies in the 17th and 18th centuries. What we
are mainly looking for are the historical rules and principles guiding various
types of controversyin this period, includingcharacteristic types of moves and
strategies and also patterns of text-production.2
Focussingonthe expressionofindividuality inthecontroversiesofthis pe-
riod provides a rewarding new perspective. There are various aims one could
pursue in the study of subjectivity in historical controversies. One could, for
example, try and ﬁnd out something about the personalities of individuals en-
gaged in controversies in the distant past. The German astronomer Johannes
Kepler,for instance,who wrote fourhundred yearsago and whom I shall men-
tiononseveraloccasions,isaveryinterestingpersonality,with alivelystyleand
a remarkable sense of humour. But this is not my primary aim in this paper.
What interests me most is the function of ﬁrst-person singular utterances as
moves in the game of controversy in the period from 1600 to 1800. What I am
looking for speciﬁcally is indicators of a characteristic rhetoric of individuality
in the controversiesof this period.
The following list provides a basic survey of some types of utterances in
modern English and some typical functions with which I shall deal in the
courseofthispaper.Theexamplesinmypaperwillbetakenfromcontroversies
in English, French and German.© 2005. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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(1) I only enter into this dispute because ...
(function: justifying one’s entering into a controversy)
(2) I shall now turn to the second argument
(function: making explicit an aspect of text organization)
(3) In my opinion this is not true
(function: ﬁrst person hedging)
(4) My opponent says that p, but I say that q
(function: marking a disagreement in quasi-dialogue)
(5) Aristotle says that p, but I say that q
(function: marking a disagreement with an authority)
(6) Nobody has done more to clarify this than I have
(function: self-praise, self-advertising)
(7) I saw it myself
(function: presenting one’s own observations or experience)
(8) What I meant was ...
(function: giving an interpretation of one’s own words)
(9) I do not understand what these words mean
(function: claiming incomprehension or incomprehensibility of one’s op-
ponents’ utterances)
(10) After observing this / reading this I realized that my original view was
wrong
(function: ﬁrst person narrative of one’s progress from error to truth)
There are of course many other moves in controversieswhich one can perform
with ﬁrstpersonexpressions,e.g.,personalcomplaintsaboutthe uselessnessof
controversies,apologies,explainingone’sintentions,confessions,evenprayers,
but I shall restrict my inquiry to the types I mentioned just now.
. On reading 17th century texts
Before going into more detail, I would like to mention the problems of inter-
pretation which we, as modern readers of 17th century texts, have to keep in
mindifwewanttoavoidbeingmisledbycertainformsofutterance.I shallgive
two examples.
The ﬁrst example concerns dedications in 17th century pamphlets, a stan-
dard textual element at that time. In these dedications we often ﬁnd formula-
tions like “this humble booklet” (e.g., “diese meine geringe Arbeit”, Feselius© 2005. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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1609, Vorrede; (dieses) von mir aufgesetzten geringen Tractätleins”, Geuder
1689, Dedication). Taken at surface value, this sounds like an expression of
humility, but in fact it is nothing of the kind; it is a typical expression of polite
self-depreciation which is a part of the style of dedications. As a rule, humil-
ity is not one of the outstanding virtues of the authors of pamphlets. On the
contrary, they very often indulge in self-praise and self-advertising, of which I
shall mention two instances later on.
As examples of polite diction are not always as obvious as in the case I
j u s tr e f e r r e dt o ,w eh a v et ob ec a r e f u lt oﬁ n do u tw h e r et h ea u t h o r se x p r e s s
genuine humility or admiration and where they are just performing routines
ofpoliteness.3 Infact,evenforcontemporariesitcouldbeembarrassingifwhat
wasmeantas merepolitenesswastakenasagenuineexpressionofattitude.For
example, Johannes Kepler, as a young man, wrote a letter to the then famous
mathematician Ursus in Prague and in polite exaggeration told him that he
(Kepler) had learnedall his mathematics fromthe books of Ursus,when in fact
hehadlearnedmathematicsfromhisprofessorMästlinatTübingenUniversity.
Later on, when Kepler himself was well-known, Ursus published this letter,
which was rather embarrassing for Kepler, as his former professor was quite
annoyed with this misrepresentation.4
The second example is more subtle, and therefore it is also more inter-
esting. It is taken from the controversy between Thomas Hobbes and the An-
glican Bishop Bramhall on the question of free will, which culminated in the
1650s. On one occasion, when Bishop Bramhall reﬂected on the “horrid con-
sequences” of Hobbes’ doctrine, he wrote: “I must confess ingenuously, I hate
this doctrine from my heart” (Bramhall, Defence, 63). Now this is about as
obvious an expression of subjectivity as you can get. It is explicitly styled as
a confession of personal hatred. However, in the margin of this passage, we
ﬁnd the note: “Psalm 139, verses 21/22”. These are the last verses of this psalm,
where King David complains about the enemies of God:
21 Do I not hate them O LORD, that hate thee? and am not I grieved with
those that rise up against thee?
22 I hate them with perfect hatred: I count them mine enemies.
Thus, in this passage, Bramhall was not using his own words but was quoting,
perhaps you should say he was alluding to, King David’s psalm. In so doing,
Bramhall indicated that his hatred was not just a personal feeling but the ap-
propriate feeling fora Bishop to have when dealing with atheists or heretics. So
what at ﬁrst sight looks like an expression of quite personal feeling, is an ex-
pressionofthe kindof feelingthat goes with Bramhall’s role as a ﬁghter against© 2005. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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God’s enemies. This kind of pious hatred (“frommer Zorn”; Gierl 1997:158)
was not only permitted to someone who was ﬁghting heretics in the 17th cen-
tury; it was actually his job to express this kind of hatred. Therefore, what
prima facie looked like a fairly clear example of pure subjectivity, turns out
to be strongly ﬁltered through role requirements. This is the kind of thing we
have to be aware of when we analyze 17th century texts. Of course, problems
of this kind also occur with modern texts, but the problem of interpretation
is much more serious when we are dealing with a fairly distant historical pe-
riod. Incidentally,inhis answerto this passage,Hobbescomplains:“Totheend
of this number there is nothing more of argument. The place is ﬁlled up with
wondering and railing” (Hobbes, LNC, 114).
. Uses of ﬁrst-person singular expressions
I shall now look at a number of uses of ﬁrst-person expressions in contro-
versies which I consider interesting from a historical point of view, as they
differ,at least partly, fromwhat we know as present-daypractice of ﬁrstperson
singular use.
. Justifying one’s entering into a controversy
As traditional controversies in pamphlets often cost a lot of time and effort
which could be usefully spent on other activities, authors frequently felt they
had to explain why they took up a challenge and entered into a controversy.
The standard place for such a personal justiﬁcation in a traditional pamphlet
was the preface to the reader. A case in point is the preface which August
Hermann Francke, the pietist theologian, wrote for a pamphlet against an or-
thodox opponent in 1707.5 There he explains why he reluctantly decided to
write this pamphlet.
(1) Therefore, although my soul normally despises quarrels amongst religious
teachers and although I would much rather suffer all malice silently in
Christian patience ... this time I have to justify myself openly before the
whole Church ... in order to prove my innocence.
Dannenhero wie feind auch sonst meine Seele dem Zanck unter Lehrern
ist / und wie viel lieber ich mich in der Gedult Christi alleine fassen ...
wolte ... so kann ich mich dennoch für dißmal nicht entbrechen / mich© 2005. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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öffentlich vor der gantzen Kirche zu verantworten / ... meine Unschuld zu
zeigen (1707:277).
Apart from justifying their entering into a controversy, authors often use pref-
aces and the closing passages of pamphlets for other personal statements, es-
pecially for presenting their personal view of the course of the controversy. So
prefaces and closing passages are an important source of information for an
enquiry into the personal aspects of controversies.
. Making explicit aspects of text organisation
I continue with a fairly inconspicuous type of utterance, which does not seem
to express anything very personal but is an interestingindicator of the authors’
awareness of their writing strategies. The following example is taken from a
pamphlet by the astromer Johannes Kepler.
(2) Here I have to introduce a question in between, which is however impor-
tant enough to deserve a detailed treatment of its own.
Allhie muß ich eine Frage zwischen eynführen / welche zwar wol der
Wichtigkeit ist / daß absonderlich von derselben gehandelt werden solte
(1610:169, 21).
This kind of utterance is very frequentin our corpus of controversies.It shows
that most oftheseauthors werehighly expert writers with anexcellentground-
ing in rhetoric, who closely monitored their own text production and tried to
help their readers understand the structure of their texts. Textual organization
in controversies is a topic in its own right, which I shall not go into in the
present paper.6
. First person hedging
T h en e x tt yp eo fu t t e r a n c eIs h a l lm e n t i o nb r i e ﬂ yi so ft h et yp e“ It h i n k ” ,“ Ia m
of the opinion” and “I suppose”. This type can be used to mark the personal
commitmentof the author to a certain belief, which is an important move in a
controversy.Butinmanycasesitseemstobeused,rather,forﬁrstpersonhedg-
ing. The central function of what I call “ﬁrst person hedging” is to reduce the
commitmentof one’s claim fromgeneralto personal level.As we know, merely
personal commitments are sometimes easier to justify than general ones. In
addition, in certain contexts, personal statements tend to be considered more© 2005. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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polite than sweeping general statements. As an example I quote a theological
hypothesis put forward by Kepler:
(3) And I suppose that man in his original state of innocence could have per-
formed these natural movements without committing sin...
Vnderachteich/daßderMenschimStandtderVnschuldtgarwolohnealle
Sünde/ ... dieser natürlichen Bewegungen sich hette gebrauchen können
(1610:158).
What Kepleris referringto withthe words “thesenaturalmovements”is sexual
intercourse. As his view on this matter is a bit unorthodox and in conﬂict with
the views of Augustine, he is careful to present his claim somewhat guardedly.
This kind of cautious speech occurs regularly in those passages where Kepler
treats delicate matters of theology. But he also uses hedges in other contexts,
e.g., when presenting his own astrological hypotheses. These are just prelimi-
nary observations which should be followed up in a special study of forms of
hedging in 17th century controversies.7
. Contrastive (emphatic) uses
The next group of uses of ﬁrst person expressions is what I call contrastive or
emphatic uses:
.. Contrastive use in quasi-dialogue
The ﬁrst type frequently serves to highlight contrast of opinion in the typical
quasi-dialogical structure of a staged polemics (cf. Fritz 2002). An example
from Kepler may sufﬁce to illustrate this type:
(4) Feselius says that my view contradicts the laws of physics. I say no...
Feselius sagt / es sey der Physica zuwider. Ich sage nein darzu... (1610:189).
This vivid presentation of the opponents’ positions gives the reader a lively
sense of dialogue and contributes to the readability of the pamphlet. So this is
a very effective bit of rhetoric.
.. Anti-authoritarian use of ﬁrst person expressions
The second type of contrastiveuse is what one could call an anti-authoritarian
use (cf. Machamer 2000:85). The prototype of this use is: Aristotle says that p,
b u tIs a yt h a tq . This move is very frequent in 17th century controversies: it is© 2005. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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usedbyKepler,Hobbesandmanyothers.Itispartoftherhetoricofinnovation
which is characteristic of this period.
But this move was no invention of the 16th or 17th centuries. In fact, we
ﬁ n dt h i st y p eo fu t t e r a n c ee v e ni nt h eM i d d l eA g e s .F o re x a m p l e ,a tt h eb e g i n -
ningofthe 13thcentury,theEmperorFredericIIwroteinhisbookonfalconry,
using the pluralis majestatis:
(5) Wherever it was appropriate, we followed Aristotle in our work. In many
cases, however, as our experience has taught us, especially concerning the
nature of certain birds, he seems to deviate from truth. Therefore, we shall
not follow the prince of philosophers in all points; for he only seldom or
neverwent huntingbirds,whereas we haveloved[falconry]fromouryouth
and have practiced it ever since (Frederic II, De arte venandi cum avibus).
In scribendo etiam Aristotilem, ubi oportuit, secuti sumus. In pluribus
enim, sicutexperientia didicimus,maxime innaturisquarundarumavium,
discrepare a veritate videtur. Propter hoc non sequimur principem philo-
sophorum in omnibus, raro namque aut nunquam venationes avium exer-
cuit,sednossemperdileximusetexercuimus(InWillemsen1942,Vol.I,1).
And in 1340, the German scholar Konrad von Megenberg wrote in his Book of
Nature:
(6) According to Pliny and Jacobus [the lynx] has such sharp eyes that it can
see through thick walls. I don’t believe this.
(Der Luhs) hat so scharpﬁu augen, sam Plinius und Jacobus sprechent, daz
er durch starch wend siht. des gelaub ich niht (Buch der Natur, 146, 27ff.).
This self-assured attitude is remarkable in medieval authors, but in the 17th
century it is quite typical, as I shall illustrate with a few examples from Kepler
and from Hobbes. In his refutation of a pamphlet by the Astrologer Röslin,
Kepler wrote:
(7) I have studied (these things), and I showed that there is a much closer re-
lationship between the heavens and Earth than Aristotle – and Röslin with
him – believes.
Dann ich hab so viel gestudiert vnd erwiesen / das zwischen Himmel vnd
Erden vil ein grössere Verwandnis seye / als Aristoteles,v n dm i tj h m eR o e s -
linus mainet (1609:107).
In a similar context, when writing about his theory of the connection be-
tween the heavensand the Earth in a later pamphlet, Kepler claimed: “Aristotle© 2005. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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knew little about these things” (“Darvon hat Aristoteles noch wenig gewust”;
Kepler 1610:200). This anti-authoritarian tendency is also shown in the way
Kepler enjoyed mentioning himself in the same breath as classical authorities:
“Galenus does not say so. I say so evenless” (“So sagt Galenus nit (ich noch vil
weniger)”; 1610:223).
Like Kepler, Hobbes is also well-known for his anti-authoritarian tenden-
cies. On severaloccasions Hobbes claimed that he, as opposed to his opponent
Bramhall, arrived at his views by thinking and meditating, and not by reading
traditional texts:
(8) [I] may with as good a grace despise the Schoolmen and some of the old
Philosophers, as he [i.e., Bramhall] can despise me, unless he can shew
that it is more likely that he should be better able to look into these ques-
tions sufﬁciently, which require meditation and reﬂection upon a man’s
own thoughts. (LNC, 63; cf. also LNC, 311)
What is at stake here is the epistemological choice between personal reﬂec-
tion and the received doctrine of scholasticism. Hobbes used this move in the
following passage as well:
(9) Anotherreason why [Bramhall thinks] I should be ofhis opinion, is thathe
[i.e., Bramhall] is “in possession of an old truth derived to him by inheri-
tance or succession by his ancestors”. To which I answer, ﬁrst, that I am in
possession of a truth derived to me from the light of reason. (LNC, 337)
Of course, the traditionalists tended to criticize this move. A good exam-
ple is Hobbes’ opponent, Bishop Bramhall, who countered Hobbes’ attack on
scholastic jargon with the following complaint:
(10) It is strange to see with what conﬁdence, now-a-days, particular men slight
all the Schoolmen, and Philosophers, and classic authors of former ages,
as if they were not worthy to unloose the shoe-strings of some modern
author.... (Bramhall, quoted in Hobbes, LN, 58)
. Self-praise and self-advertising
17th century rules of politeness condemned self-praise. Nevertheless, few au-
thors could resist the temptation to praise their own achievements and ad-
vertise their own writings. A case in point is Leibniz’s reference to his own
Theodicy in the following passage from the Leibniz/Clarke controversy:© 2005. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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(11) [people tend to misrepresent my position on necessity and fate] although
probably no one else has explained better and more fundamentally than
myself in the Theodicy the real difference between liberty, contingency,
spontaneity on the one hand and absolute necessity, chance, and force on
the other. (Leibniz 1715/1716:389)
In a similar fashion Kepler referred to an earlier work of his and advertised his
successful theories:
(12) ForIhavesetupthesePrinciplesofPhysicsinmy recentlypublishedCom-
mentaries on the movements of Mars in such a fashion as to enable anyone
tofollowmycalculationsandtotreatthewholeofastronomyonthisbasis.
Dann ich hab diese principia Physica in meinem newlich außgangenen
commentario Martismotuumalso angestellt/daßman jhnennachrechnen
/ vnd die gantze Astronomiam damit abhandeln kann. (1610:193)
An extreme case of self-advertizing is Hobbes’ statement at the end of his
“Epistle to the reader” in Of liberty and necessity:
(13) thou art now acquainted with that man, who, in matters of so great im-
portance as those of thy salvation, furnishes thee with better instructions,
than any thou hast ever been acquainted with, what profession, persuasion,
opinion,o rchurch soever thou art of. (LN, 238)
That man, of course, is Hobbes himself.
A variant of this kind of self-praise is the self-ascription of victory which
we often ﬁnd in the title-pages of 17th century pamphlets (cf. also Gloning
1999:101). Hobbes, for example, uses this move in the title-page of Of liberty
and neccessity:
(14) Hobbes, Thomas: Of liberty and necessity: A treatise wherein all contro-
versy concerning predestination, election, free-will, grace, merits, repro-
bation, etc. is fully decided and cleared. In answer to a treatise written by
the Bishop of Londonderry, on the same subject.
. Presenting one’s own observations and experience
In the ﬁeld of science, the main motivation for not following the lead of clas-
sical authors was that authors of the “modern” period emphasized the impor-
tance of their own experience and their personal observations as instruments
of knowledge.© 2005. John Benjamins Publishing Company
All rights reserved
JB[v.20020404] Prn:4/08/2005; 10:04 F:CVS110.tex / p.10(522-563)
 Gerd Fritz
Kepler is again a good example of this attitude. When his opponent Fes-
elius asserted that the Astronomer Valeriola had claimed that certain forms of
astrology could not become a serious science, Kepler answered:
(15) That this is true I do not believe because Valeriola said so. As far as he is
concerned I could easily deny it and then make him prove it: But I have
my own experience in this matter.
Daß es also wahr sey / gläube ich nicht eben von deßwegen / weil es Vale-
riola gesagt / seinethalben köndt ichs wol verneinen / vnd es jhn probiern
lassen: sondern ich hab es selbst erfahren. (1610:179, 14ff.)
On another occasion, when Feselius denied that a certain constellation of the
Sun and Saturn could inﬂuencethe weather, Kepler presenteda long extract of
his daily metereological observations, which he had made for the last 16 years,
i.e., from 1592 to 1609 (Kepler 1610:254f.). It is, incidentally, interesting to
see that these metereological observations had originally been motivated by a
hypothesis concerning the parallelism between musical harmonies and stellar
geometry, which Kepler had to give up later (p. 205).
It is important to note, however, that Kepler did not accept observation
alone as the guide to scientiﬁc knowledge.When his elder friend Röslin argued
that he – Röslin – himself had observed and taken notes of the movements of
the comet of 1580, when Kepler was not yet 10 years old, Kepler admitted that
these observations were highly valuable and that he himself could use them.
But he insisted that inorderto understandthe phenomenoncorrectly, onehad
to have an adequate theory (Kepler uses the word theoremata), i.e., the theory
that comets ﬂy in a straight line (cf. Kepler 1609:119–124).
And, of course, the senses might mislead. When Röslin claimed that the
hypothesis that the Earth moves around the Sun contradicts the testimony of
the senses, Kepler replied:
(16) I will gladly admit that it contradicts the senses that the Earth should
move around the Sun. But that is not important. For it is for that pur-
pose that God gave us Reason to compensate for the deﬁciencies of our
outward senses.
Das es wider die eusserliche Sinne das die Erden soll vmblauffen / bekenn
ich gern / vnd hat nit viel zu bedeuten: dann eben darumb hat vns Gott
die vernunfft gegeben / das wir darmit den mangel der eusserlichen Sinne
ersetzen sollen. (1609:107, 5ff.)© 2005. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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Thus, according to Kepler, it is observation compensated by reason which
furthers scientiﬁc knowledge.
Interesting examples of reports of personal experiences are also provided
bythemedicalcontroversybetweenGehemaandGeuderonthetopicofblood-
letting and other traditional forms of therapy.8 As arguments for their respec-
tive sides both doctors report their own cases of successful therapy; Geuder,
the traditionalist, reports a case where bloodletting was successful (Geuder
1689:32)andGehema,themodernist,reportshowhe successfullytreatedfever
with warm beverages, which another doctor had unsuccessfully treated with
cold drinks (Gehema 1688:58f.). Obviously, in the case of medical controver-
sies, personal reports of successful treatments play a signiﬁcant role not only
as empirical data but also as a means of strenghthening the doctors’ authority.
I should like to add that 17th century scientists knew very well the traditional
wisdomthatitwasafallacytoinferageneralstatementfromaparticular obser-
vation, and used this principle in refuting the opponent’s “argument by expe-
rience”: “An inference from a particular [premise] to a universal [conclusion]
is invalid” (Geuder 1689:66f.).9
. Misunderstanding and self-interpretation
Misunderstandings and possibly intentional misinterpretations frequently oc-
cur in the controversies of our corpus. Very often these misunderstandings
indicate deep-seateddifferencesandlack of mutual knowledge.Thus, attempts
at clarifying such misunderstandings play an important role in the growth of
mutual knowledge. It is worth mentioning that we noticed no debate about
ﬁrst-person authority concerning the interpretation of one’s own utterances.
The requisite principle, formulated in Latin, was obviously generally accepted:
quisque optimus verborum suorum interpres.10
Clarifyingmisunderstandingsby givingan interpretationof one’s owntext
is a very frequent move, which I shall not document here in detail. An ex-
ample is Kepler’s dedication of his Antwort to Röslin (1609), where Kepler
claimed that Röslin had misunderstood several passages from his (Kepler’s)
book De stella nova in pede Serpentarii and that he intended to clarify these
misunderstandings,which he did in various passages of his pamphlet.© 2005. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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. Claiming incomprehension
I do not understand what these words mean is one of Hobbes’ favourite objec-
tions against his opponent Bramhall. The following is a wonderful example of
the irony connected with this move:
(17) This term of insufﬁcient cause, which also the Schools call deﬁcient,t h a t
theymayrhyme toefﬁcient,isnotintelligible,butaworddevisedlikehocus
pocus, to juggle a difﬁculty out of sight... I can make no answer; because
I understand no more what he means by sufﬁciency in a divided sense,
and sufﬁciency in a compounded sense, than if he had said sufﬁciency in
a divided nonsense, and sufﬁciency in a compoundednonsense. (Hobbes,
LNC, 384)
On the one hand, this is an aggressive and arrogant move, which implies that
the opponent is either too stupid to realize that he is talking nonsense or that
he is talking nonsense on purpose in order to fool his opponent and his read-
ers, which is even worse. On the other hand, it is a defensive move that gives
the controversialist a chance to avoid getting drawn into a maze of scholastic
discussions. From this point of view the move has a therapeutical function.
For an opponent of scholastic thought it is probably the only chance to avoid
being forced to play the scholastic game. It is therefore not surprising that
anti-scholastics like Galileo, Bacon and others should have used this move
(cf. Biagioli 1993:211f.). But Hobbes is probably the 17th century author who
cultivated this strategy with most delight.
T w om o r ee x a m p l e so ft h i sk i n do fm o v ec o m ef r o mS a m u e lC l a r k e ,
who used this move twice against Leibniz in their controversy on space and
other matters:
(18) 41. What the meaning of these words is; An Order (or Situation) which
m a k e sB o d i e st ob eS i t u a b l e ; I understand not (in Leibniz 1715/1716:387).
20. What This tends to prove, with regard to the Argument before us, I
understand not (in Leibniz 1715/1716:385).
In the ﬁrst case, Leibniz answered that he was misquoted:
(19) 104. I am not saying that space is an order or situation which makes ob-
jects positionable; to say that would be nonsense... I am thus not saying
that space is an order or situation, but an order of situations.
104. Je ne dis point que l’Espace et un ordre ou situation qui rend les
choses situables; ce seroit parler galimatias... Je ne dis donc point que© 2005. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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l’Espace et un ordre ou situation, mais un ordre des situations. (Leibniz
1715/1716:415)
In the second case Leibniz just complained that his opponent intention-
ally refused to understand why Leibniz had said what he had said (Leibniz
1715/1716:409).
. Personal narrative of one’s progress from error to truth
Progress from error to truth is a model situation for the growth of knowledge.
It is therefore not surprising that we ﬁnd personal narratives representing this
kind of event in a more or less propagandistic manner. I shall give two exam-
ples, one from Kepler and one from the medical controversy between Gehema
and Geuder.
In the course of his answer to Feselius and Röslin, Kepler told his oppo-
nents that he had originally assumed a close parallelism between musical har-
monies and the geometryof the planets’ constellations. But as his observations
did not bear out this assumption, he had to modify his theory (1610:205).The
moral of this story was that, as an open-minded scientist, Kepler was prepared
to change his theories if his observations forced him to do so.
More dramatically, in 1688 the medical man Gehema related his conver-
sion from traditional Galenic medicine to modern medicine in a ﬁrst person
narrative. He told his readers that he had already started doubting the wis-
dom of traditional medicine when he read some of the medical reformers of
his day. He then reported that, soon after, he saw the light of truth, for which
enlightenmenthe still thanked God every day (1688:74f.). Of course, the main
function of this story of enlightenmentwas to emphasize the contrast with the
traditionalists, who still lived in the darkness of medical ignorance.
. Conclusion
For modern readers, subjectivity is probably not the most striking feature of
contributions to 17th century controversies. On the contrary, in this period
controversiesseem to be very much guided by traditional rules and principles,
not the least of which is the principle that one should deal with realia and not
with personalia. In judging potential loci of subjectivity, we have to take into
account, amongst other factors, the typical rhetoric of contemporary genres© 2005. John Benjamins Publishing Company
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(e.g.,dedications and prefaces),contemporaryrulesofetiquetteand principles
of text construction.
As the material presented in this paper shows, however, we do ﬁnd many
remarkable passages where authors mention personal experiences, voice per-
sonal opinions, and make personal reﬂections. And this is not just the case in
Descartes’ Meditations and other major works of the period, but also in texts
of minor authors. Thus, there is much material for a comprehensive study of
the 17th century rhetoric of individuality or subjectivity. At least some of these
forms of expression of subjectivity could be regarded as facets of the rhetoric
of innovation typical of the period.
Notes
. The project was supported by the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientiﬁc Research and
Development (GIF) in the years 1999 to 2001.
. This project is part of a long-term research endeavour in historical pragmatics,especially
in the history of forms of communication (cf. Fritz 1995). The importance of a pragmatic
approach to the study of controversy was ﬁrst emphasized by Marcelo Dascal (cf. 1989).
. On routines of politeness characteristic of the period under survey cf. Beetz (1999).
. The history of Kepler’s controversy with Ursus is investigated in Jardine (1984).
. A pragmatic analysis of the controversy between August Hermann Francke and his op-
ponent Johann Friedrich Mayer is presented in Fritz and Glüer (2001).
. The strategies of text organization in 17th and 18th centuries controversies have been
analyzed in detail in the case studies produced in the course of the project, e.g., Fritz (2001),
Fritz (2002) and Fritz and Glüer (2001).
. Hedging in present day scientiﬁc writing has recently been studied by several authors,
e.g., Hyland (1998).
. The results of an in-depth case study of this controversy are presented in Gloning and
Lüsing (2002).
. “A particulari ad universale nulla valet consequentia”.
. “Everyone is the best interpreter of his own words”.
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